Test MCP agents for context-worm propagation

mcparasite tests whether an LLM agent will carry a malicious instruction across the Model Context Protocol boundary. A context worm plants an instruction in one place an agent reads, a repo file, a chat message, a tool result, and relies on the agent to copy it into the next place it writes. The tool models that behaviour as a set of propagation channels and attack scenarios you can enumerate before you exercise any of them.

Two modes decide what the node does. The default, mode=list, produces a booth-safe inventory of the channels and scenarios the framework supports and needs no credentials at all. Setting mode=run executes a kill chain against a real provider, so it requires an LLM API key on the vault ports; an ungated run is blocked rather than silently skipped.

The Trickest node writes findings.jsonl into a folder, which is what makes the inventory schedulable. The MCP Trust Boundary Suite runs it beside HoneyMCP and correlates both outputs, so a change in the channel surface shows up as a retest delta instead of a rerun you have to read by eye.